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RESTRICTED 
THE ROLE OF THE NAVY IN FUTURE WARFARE 
A lecture delivered by 
Rear Admiral Charles R. Brown, USN 
at the Naval War College 
February 15, 1949 
The title of my talk today is the role of the Navy in future 
warfare. In such a discussion my inclination is to immediately 
thrust myself into the future since the history of the past, however 
glorious, is of little but academic interest to us unless it has definite 
application in the future. 
However, I find it impossible to proceed without first ex­
plaining my concept of the functions and purposes of a navy and 
this, in turn, inevitably leads me into a brie:f review of the past. 
So, if you will forgive me, l will broaden my subject to include the 
role of the Navy, or more properly expressed, the role of sea power 
in the past, present and future. For sea power has never meant 
simply navies alone. It has always meant the sum total of all 
weapons, installations, and geographical and other circumstances 
-all factors which enable a nation to control and exploit the sea
during war time. One of the most important elements of sea power
is shipping, in which is still carried (and for an indefinite time to
come will continue to be carried) most of the men and commodities
that move across the sea. It would be just as unreasoning to con­
sider sea power in te�ms of warships alone, as it would be to con­
sider railroad trains in terms solely of locomotives. A locomotive
represents power-true enough-but, without cars attached, it is
power with no functional meaning. And, without shipping naval ef�
forts are equally negative. We may keep the enemy from using the
sea, but that does not enable us to use the sea for ourselves.
Admiral Brown is Chief of Staff to the President of the Naval War 
College. 
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The history of most great wars is rich with examples of 
shippings' contribution to the war effort. Most of the materials that 
went into the British aircraft that hurled back the luftwaffe in the 
Battle of Britain of 1940 were brought to the scene of operation 
by ship. Without shipping, not all of the guns, and tanks, and 
soldiers, and airplanes in the world could have saved Britain. And 
the same applies to the later bomber offensive against Germany. 
Most of the men, and the food they ate, and the fuel and bombs 
needed to mount that offensive, came across on a bridge of ships. 
Russian might was kept in the war by the food and munitions we 
sent across the sea. And Japan was defeated by the great American 
advance that was literally floated across the vast reaches of the 
Pacific. 
We think of Germany's role in the last war as that of a land 
power only. But even she leaned heavily on her shipping. She 
needed it in the Baltic and the North Sea for support of her Russian 
operations and for maintenance of her vital communications with 
Scandinavia. She used it coastwise between Germany, the Low 
Countries, and France to relieve a heavily overburdened rail and 
highway system. And while Italy remained in the fight and an 
active front existed across the Mediterranean, shipping was an in- · 
dispensable means not only of handling Italian coastwise transporta­
tion, but of maintaining military communications with the Axis 
armies in North Africa. And I might add parenthetically, the 
Allied offensive against that shipping was the determining element 
in forcing Rommel's retreat. 
But nowhere was the need of shipping so compelling as it 
was with Japan. It is curious that, upon the entrance of the United 
States and Japan into war, the daily press made full comparison 
of their relative naval strength, but forgot to note that Japan had 
never more than nine million tons of shipping with which to carry on 
commerce and military enterprises over a vast maritime area. It 
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was never enough and, with increasing losses to our submarines, air­
craft and other weapons, her national economy rapidly deteriorated 
and then collapsed. 
The ugly little tramp steamer thus occupies an important 
quarter of the shield of naval power. It is less splendid than the 
great aircraft carrier but no less vital. Both are ships and, to all 
the embattled nations of the last war, there was nothing quite so 
valuable as a ship. And it will continue to be so in the future. It 
is a fundamental law of Physics. That is, you can build a huge tub 
-call it a hull if you will-and float it on the surface of the water.
It floats by itself, mind you; it requires no power to keep it afloat.
You can fill it up with goods, or guns, or airplanes, or soldiers,
and with relatively little power you can move it cheaply to any
point you wish. There are no rails or roadbeds to worry about, no
mountains to cross, no tunnels to dig. It is by far the cheapest and
easiest means of transportation known to man. And the more our
civilization advances the 'more we will come to use this cheap and
easy road of the sea for all of our bulk transportation.
We are all familiar with the role of the naval airplane in the 
last war. It was used for search, observation and reconnaissance 
in,every phase, and so distinguished an officer as Admiral Spruance 
has expressed the opinion that photographic reconnaissance alone 
provided us with a wealth of vital material which could never have 
been hoped for in the past and without which countless lives might 
have been unnecessarily expended. The airplane also proved an in­
valuable weapon in anti-submarine warfare, both in its own right 
and as a closely articulated member of air-surface hunter-killer 
teams. But it was with the aircraft carrier that �he naval airplane 
achieved its most dramatic successes, for the part played by our 
carriers was dominant and indispensable. They assured us a con­
centration of air strength possessed of extreme mobility, range and 
endurance. They spearheaded and supported our amphibious ad-
3 
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vance at every long step in the Pacific. The immense distances 
and widely scattered defenses offered great opportunity for the em­
ployment of these mobile forces which struck at great range and left 
all but selected targets by-passed and isolated. In a war in which 
command of the air was essential, they never failed to gain that 
command at the required time and place. In a naval war, they 
destroyed the enemy fleet and annihilated the air power of that 
fleet. In an amphibious war, they excelled in the direct support 
of troops. And all of these things, combined with the mobility 
and long sea-keeping ability of the American Fleet, gave their at­
tack a feature of continuous initiative and surprise revolutionary in 
the progress of warfare. 
Furthermore, we have now crossed a threshold. Using 
atomic bombs and other new weapons of science, the flexibility and 
destructiveness of the carrier airplane has been increased many fold. 
And the Navy, no longer shackled by the historic barriers of the 
shoreline, can now strike telling blows deep in enemy territory. For, 
with no intention of detracting from the land-based airplane but in 
simple justice to its carrier-based sister, it must be recognized that 
the aircraft carrier task force provides the only truly mobile air force 
in the world. Not only the aircraft themselves, but their fields are 
capable of rapid movement. It is therefore, a force with all of the 
peculiar advantages of mobility such as the ability to concentrate 
and the ability to achieve surprise while the land-based enemy 
struggles to redeploy aircraft scattered over hundreds of fixed 
fields which may be separated by thousands of miles. Redeploy­
ment of aircraft to meet such threats is next to impossible, so the 
blow must be absorbed by local defense forces. To be effective 
the enemy must be strong everywhere, a most difficult thing to 
achieve. 
To state it in another way, the aircraft carrier may be said 
to gather up and coordinate all the principles of war and employ 
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them with prime emphasis on the principles of mass, movement 
and surprise. 
The carrier's compact, self-sufficient organization gives con­
ditions very difficult to obtain ashore, particularly in advanced 
theaters. The aircraft receive excellent upkeep and repair, and the 
air crews live in surroundings which enhance efficiency and morale. 
Air operations are served by a highly compact intelligence and com­
munication organization which permits up-to-the-minute briefing 
prior to take-off and precise control in the air. Cruising in enemy 
waters, the task force is protected by its fighter patrols, a certain 
number of which may be airborne during daylight periods, and by 
its night fighters during darkness. These fighters are directed to 
their interceptions by highly trained personnel using excellent radar 
equipment. Radar picket vessels and airborne early warning sets 
extend the effective range of this radar many miles beyond the 
task force. Such enemy aircraft as can penetrate this fighter plane 
defense are met over the task group by a truly tremendous concen­
tration of anti-aircraft fire which, directed by radar, denies the 
enemy planes the advantages of cloud cover and darkness. The 
heavi�r shells, of course, are influence fused and explode when 
passing within lethal range of an aircraft. An average fast carrier 
task group of the last war had a concentration of over 1600 guns 
to use in its defense. When translated into fire-power, gentlemen, 
that means over 6,000 bullets per second or just under 200 tons of 
steel every minute. This, in its ability to deliver hot metal, sur­
passes any conceivable concentration of artillery ashore. It was 
positively brutal and it is small wonder that even those Japs who 
were not suicidally inclined grew to consider an anti-carrier 
mission as almost automatic enrollment in the Kamikaze Corps. 
· Before leaving the carrier, I would like to point out that
the carrier-based airplane is not and should not be considered as 
a rival of the land-based airplane. The two are capable of a bril-
5 
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liant partnership which can multiply rather than add to the over­
all effectiveness of our effort. For in war, as in any organic phen­
omenon, the whole is infinitely more than the mechanical sum of its 
parts. Land-air power can and does operate over the seas and 
not only should this be recognized, but it should be welcomed and 
utilized to the fullest. By the same token it should be equally ap­
parent and gratifying that sea-air power can operate over the land 
with equal facility and effectiveness. The defenses of the enemy 
can be spread thin by the more varied direction of sea-air power's 
attack making easier the more inflexible approach of land-air 
power. On the other hand, land-air power, by the crushing weight 
of its sustained offensive, can aid and abet these rapier-like thrusts 
of sea-air power. There is no duplication unless it is the duplica­
tion of the "one-two" punch. 
New weapons have had a profound effect upon the thinking of 
us all. The blinding fury of atomic warfare unhappily represents 
man's most significant conquest since the discovery of fire. The 
historic balance between offense .and defense has been utterly 
destroyed. To deny the impact of this on naval thinking would be 
downright folly. Indeed it would be courting disaster. 
Every new weapon is a challenge to sea power; a challenge 
to recognize it, utilize it, and def end itself against it-:-or perish. 
Even those new weapons of the last war enormously complicated 
our problems. They opened new avenues to us, closed others, and 
in many cases circumscribed the profitable employment of the Navy. 
Today, we have atomic fission. Tomorrow (when it comes and it 
will come) we will have the ultra-long range guided missile with an 
atomic head. We must, all of us-ground, sea and air-learn how 
to utilize these weapons and how to def end ourselves against them. 
Victory or defeat, when and if we must fight again, will hinge 
upon the degree of our success in doing this. 
6 
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By the same token we must never permit our enthusiasm for 
the new to cause us to prematurely discard the old. Certainly, 
we must cast away garments which are moth-eaten. But we must 
avoid swapping a serviceable coat for a new one that does not fit. 
Our job is to sharpshoot; setting our sights neither too high nor too 
low. We must come forth with , the most nearly correct answer 
obtainable. We are no longer blessed with unlimited resources, and 
we must be certain that those we have are divided in the most ef­
fective manner. 
In remembering that the war of tomorrow is to be fought 
with new weapons, we must not forget that so was the war of yes­
terday and the day before that. T�e unresting progress of mankind 
causes continual changes in weapons. Drastic change has been so 
persistent during the last one hundred years that (if I might be 
permitted to coin a phrase) change may be said to have become one 
of the constants of strategy; 
And a review of the past will warn us against the dangers 
of being too quick to discard as well as too slow to adopt. For 
example, the opinions expressed between the last two wars on the 
role of air in sea operations were too often founded on theory 
motivated by personal prejudice. And to a large degree the ut­
terances of both visionary and reactionary were ultimately proved 
false. Those who planned on naval engagements after the fashion 
of Jutland and Trafalgar were bitterly disappointed. Those who 
scoffed at the menace of the airplane saw their dreams go up in the 
black, greasy smoke at Pearl Harbor. But those who proceeded, 
because of the startling successes of submarines and aircraft, to 
paint with reckless brush pictures of war taking place wholly in the 
air or wholly under seas were found to be equally wide of the mark. 
False proclamations were issued that navies were obsolete, that the 
heavy bomber would interdict all sea lanes, that no ship could op-
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erate within reach of land-based airplanes, and so on; · predictions 
which were not borne out by the experience of any warring nation. 
Technology marches on a broad f�ont. Its progress is not 
confined to those few implements whi�h, today, seemed favored of 
the gods. Those impiements which, today, seem threatened with 
extinction may sometimes use the same technology to develop to­
morrow new means of offensive usage, thus furthering their in­
trinsic merit, and new means of defending themselves, thus contin­
uing their useful life. What we will then have will not be a retul'.n 
. to the conditions of yesterday, but something new and distinctive. 
It is a great misfortune that a discussion such as this can 
seldom be indulged in without creating bitterness which generates 
resistance and, in the end, delays progress. The simple fact is 
that change must occur. To ignore it is disastrous. But revolutions 
are seldom as complete as revolutionaries hope, and the wise man 
must travel the unpopular and little publicized middle road, being 
neither lulled by the wishful thinking of black reactionaries, nor 
swept away by the rantings of wild-eyed enthusiasts. 
But enough of the present. Let us look into the future. 
And as we look into that future we see many factors affecting the 
employment of navies. But during the foreseeable future it is 
equally clear that there will continue to be a place for navies­
both their surface and air components. Indeed, so long as there 
are oceans there will be ships. No serious student of sea power 
(and these students are by no means confined to the naval pro­
fession) has yet to suggest that sea power is on the way out. It 
was no "happenstance" that the greatest of all air wars and the one 
which saw the most titanic land battles of all times was also the 
greatest of all sea wars. World War II saw sea power reach its 
heights in its influence on history; not alone in the magnitude of 
operations, but in the degree to which those operations contributed 
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to final victory. And, in any great war in the future, sea power is 
still as certain to be decisive as it formerly has been. Indeed, the 
greatly increased quantity and complexity of equipment to be used 
in future wars makes sea power even more important than ever 
before. Just as an army is useful in land warfare, for those who 
propose to fight across the seas, a navy is a necessary possession. 
In the hands of an intelligent and understanding high command it is 
an invaluable weapon. And I might add this: 
Sea power is the friend, ally and indeed the proud servant of 
air power. For, with the aid of land power, it can seize, develop 
and support overseas air bases close to an enemy, thereby multi­
plying the effectiveness of air power by many, many fold, For if we 
cut the distance a bomber must fly in half we multiply its eff �ctive­
ness by four. If we cut the distance down to one fourth, we mul­
tiply its effectiveness by sixteen. In other words, given the same 
size air force, we will have sixteen times as many bombers to fight 
a war at this range (indicating) as we would have if we were 
forced to fight out at this range (indicating). 
This old law of mathematics applies to all weapons from the 
bow and arrow to the guided missile. The day of the long range 
guided missile is still many years in the future but, when it comes, 
navies will still be needed to take it closer to the enemy. Modern 
weapons are enormously expensive. This is true whether we are 
speaking of a jet bomber costing several million dollars or an atomic 
bomb the cost of which is a measurable percentage of our national 
effort. We must not waste them trying to hit a target thousands 
of miles away when we have the means of getting much closer. 
So much for the foreseeable future and, for that matter, the 
predictable future which lies just beyond that. But what of the 
speculative future-the "wide· blue yonder", the day of the ultra-
9 
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long range guided missile with an atomic head-what about sea 
power then? 
First, let us examine the most accepted version of warfare 
in the atomic age. It seems universally conceded that, with our 
present type of government, we must accept, not deliver the first 
blow. I decline to subscribe to this gloomy view but, however you 
view it, such warfare is not attractive. Cities will be vast catas­
trophe areas, and the normal channels of communications and 
transportation will be in unutterable confusion. Even the smaller 
towns and the rural areas, though perhaps not struck directly, will 
be in varying degrees of confusion and disorganization due to the 
collapse of the metropolitan centers with which their economies are 
intertwined. 
Of course, a great deal can be done in the way of passive de­
fense, such as going underground and decentralizing and reorgan­
izing vital industries and services, and adopting other methods to 
avoid complete paralysis of the nation. But the idea that a nation, 
after weeks of atomic warfare, could achieve a fraction of the pro­
duction of America, during World War II simply does not make 
sense. The atomic war must be fought largely with stockpiles of 
arms in their finished state. Stockpiles of raw materials may be 
practically valueless; just as useless as that huge pile of gold we 
kept buried in the ground throughout World War II. And incident­
ally, let us not forget that gold too was once an essential sinew of 
war, and it is most doubtful that our forefathers ever foresaw the 
day when it would not be. 
Thus it can be seen that our ability to strike back after an 
atomic attack will depend upon the degree to which our armed 
forces ·have made themselves independent of the urban communities 
and their industries for supply and support. In the past our mili­
tary establishments have simply been cadres which underwent 
10 
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enormous but slow expansion after the outbreak of war. Such ex­
pansion cannot take place after an atomic attack. , The idea that 
must be hammered home above all else is that practically the only 
forces which will be able to fight after an atomic attack will con­
sist of those already in uniform using the arms and equipment 
already in the arsenals. And those arsenals must be in caves in the 
wilderness or otherwise suitably dispersed, hidden, and protected. 
It has been suggested (and the suggestion seems sound) 
that the forces which will fight in an atomic war should be divided 
into three elements. The first will be the "Retaliatory Force", 
which will return the bombardment with our own atomic weapons. 
This force must remain in sharp isolation from the national com­
munity. Its functions must not be compromised in the slightest by 
the demands for relief from the stricken areas. The "Retaliatory 
Force" must either be a highly mobile sea force or one which has 
been scattered over a large number of dispersed reservations. Pos­
sibly it wiH be a combination of these two, but if a portion of the 
"Retaliatory Force" is to occupy reservations, each reservation must 
be of a considerable area to permit atomic explosives and their 
carriers to be secreted and protected as much as possible by under­
ground storage. The entire "Retaliatory Force" must have a com­
pletely independent system of inter-communications, since the 
supreme command may have been eliminated or its communications 
disrupted almost immediately. 
The second force will be known as the "Defensive Force". Its 
mission will be to resist invasion, to def end against the bombard­
ment of atomic missiles by whatever scentific means that have 
been developed, to organize the relief of the stricken areas, and to 
administer the interior along as nearly constitutional lines as pos­
sible. Here, if anywhere, is the place for the citizen army. But it 
must be admirably trained and capable of at least local mobilization. 
There will be no time for training and nation-wide mobilization once 
11 
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atomic warfare starts. Perhaps the old ideal of the minute man with 
his musket over the fireplace will be resurrected in suitably modern­
ized form. In any event, adequate provisions will have to be made 
for local mobilization, for maximum clecentralization of arms and 
supply depots, and also for decentralization of tactical authority. 
Strategical rather than tactical concentration will be necessary to 
avoid high spatial density of military fQrces. And it must be again 
emphasized that the arms, supplies and implements of transporta­
tion to be depended upon will be those stockpiled in as secure a 
ma11:ner as possible. 
One more word about the Defensive Force, there is a popular 
school of thought today that atomic war necessitates emphasis on 
pure defense and the expenditure of vast sums on defense alone. I 
cannot go along with this despite the hypothetical proofs advanced. 
History is too replete with instances of the "Maginot Line" theories 
that have fallen before a dynamic and well conceived offense. I do 
not mean to say our defensive forces will. be unimportant, but no 
aggressor nation will be discouraged from attacking us because of 
the excellence of our def ens es alone. She will be far more deterred 
by visible evidence that we have the offensive potential to deal her 
decisive blows. 
And it is therefore to the operations of the third force 
known as the "Offensive Force" to which your most thoughtful at­
tention is invited. The outcome of the war, the decision as to who 
is victor and who is vanquished (a sorry distinction at best in 
times of atomic warfare) will depend upon the strategic. situation 
existing after about the first sixty days of war. I know of only two 
factors influencing the strategic situation after the first sixty days 
of atomic war. One is morale, always a gambler's choice when 
dealing with the speculative future. Building up a national morale 
of such toughness and resiliency that it can withstand the shock of 
this type of warfare is a matter of supreme importance to the mili-
12 
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tary thinker, but it is beyond the scope of the present discussion. I 
mention it now simply to indicate my recognition of the problem. 
But let us return to the remaining factor influencing the 
strategic situation after the first sixty days of atomic warfare. This 
factor will be based upon the degree of success of the "Offensive 
Force". Remember the "Retaliatory Force" is engaged in bringing 
the enemy down to our own level. The "Defensive Force" is avoid­
ing titter chaos. If the "Offensive Force" can seize and rapidly de­
velop a section of enemy territory which dominates the enemy's
vital areas then that force will be in a position to continue the 
initial retaliatory bombardment on a far more effective scale. Not 
only that but it will relieve pressure on the homeland, since much 
of the enemy's resources must be directed against the captured 
area. Thus we draw double on our money since the effectiveness 
of our own bombardment is increased while the effectiveness of the 
enemy's bombardment is decreased. 
Obviously, the' "Offensive Force" must be completely pro­
. f essional and trained to the utmost degree. The target to be 
seized must be of a considerable area but, since the forces available 
will be limited, it must also be one which can be fairly easily con­
quered and even more easily def ended from reconquest. And it 
should be repeated that it must be one that dominates the enemy's 
vital areas. 
Extreme swiftness of invasion will be of inestimable value. 
This makes the employment of air power most inviting and un­
questionably it will be utilized to the· limit. But the invasion, 
occupation, development and support of a considerable area solely 
or even chiefly · by air would be an incredibly difficult task, even 
if we assume a minimum of air opposition. The task of the of­
fensive force is obviously one tailored to sea power. But it must 
be a sea power geared to atomic warfare. Its organization, logis-
13 
13
Brown: The Role of the Navy in Future Warfare
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
tics and tactics must conform to the requirements of atomic war­
fare. Ordinary harbors and ports as we know them will be use­
less. Supplies, replacements and spare parts must be loaded over 
the beaches from dispersed, hidden and protected arsenals. All 
ships must be kept adequately dispersed at all time�even prior 
to· the outbreak of hostilities. The invasion force itself must be 
already embarked, or at least capable of swift embarkation from 
hundreds of isolated points for, almost immediately, all ships must 
be ready to .proceed to predetermined rendezvous and from thence 
to the chosen objective, where a swift invasion will be undertaken 
·,\ utilizing surprise to the utmost. It will be an herculean task, in­
\rolving not only the seizure of territory but its development with
·�credible rapidity into launching sites suitably separated and ade­
q��teiy supplied.
There briefly sketched, is one version of warfare in the 
atomic age. As mentioned at the beginning, it is not a pretty pic­
ture. It is unnecessary to say that we all most fervently hope the 
world will be spared this Armageddon. But in the calamitous 
event that it cannot, our job as always will be to win the war. We 
must realize. that a reasonable state of readiness by past· standards 
may invite disastrous defeat in the future. During the transitional 
years that lie ahead of us, our thinking and our planning must re­
main broad and flexible to insure that we achieve a maximum state 
of readiness at all times. 
Perhaps most of you will feel that I have painted a much 
too gloomy picture of the future. Well, I agree. I have my per­
sonal doubts that atomic warfare, horrible as it may be, will ever 
reach the cataclysmic proportions I have outlined. But a good 
planner must plan for the worst and hope for the best, and I have 
simply chosen the worst situation so that we might examine the 
role of sea power under such conditions. Actually, as I have said, 
I question the ability of even the atomic bomb to so completely 
14 
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destroy such vast areas as our land presents. Further than that, I 
refuse to subscribe to a doctrine of despair. I decline to accept it 
as our inescapable fate that we must suffer the full measure of 
destructiveness this terrible weapon does possess. I heartily sub­
scribe to the homely old saying that: "There ain't no holt what can't 
be broke." Science presented us with atomic warfare. Science must 
provide defenses against it. She may not, indeed probably 
cannot find a complete answer, but she must give us something 
which will offer humanity a more reasonable chance of survival 
than the measures that I, as an unscientific student of warfare, 
have been able to outline today. 
But, whatever the specific changes indicated by atomic war­
fare, this much is clear. Our military leaders must bestir- them­
selves to a wholly unprecedented degree in revising military con­
cepts inherited from the past. They must be prepared to dismiss 
as possibly irrevelant lessons learned the hard way in the last war. 
This will not be easy. It would be much easier if we had lost the 
war, or had our leadership been stupid, blundering or marked by 
unnecessary delay in adjustment. But such a judgment is not cor­
rect in spite of the malicious slander of lesser men. I do not con� 
tend that no mistakes were made. But, on the whole, our leader­
ship was unquestionably brilliant and remarkable in its flexibility. 
Our ground forces proved to be masters of mechanized and amphib­
ious warfare, our navy was not found wedded to the battle-line, 
crossing-the-"T" type of warfare (and don't let anyone ever tell 
"" you that, no matter who he may be-no navy ever handled air 
power more intelligently or effectively) and our air force, though 
sincerely wedded to the theory of pure air power, rendered timely 
and invaluable close air support to the sister services. 
The problems we face today have grown too great to be 
solved by the "specialized" thinking of the pa1;1t. The crying need 
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today is for large numbers of military thinkers who collectively 
will represent a "super" Clausewitz or a "super" Mahan-brilliant 
strategists, not of land power, not of sea power, and not of air 
power, but able broad-gauged individuals who can view the whole 
picture of military strategy and come forth with well-reasoned and 
dispassionate answers to the warfare of the future. I am not speak­
ing of a super general staff, but of the leaders within the several 
services. Perhaps such paragons can be found just as great needs 
in the past gave us an Abraham Lincoln or a George Washington. 
But they will not come unless the irresistable urge is built up to find 
them, to know whom we seek. This means that those of us of the 
military cloth must cease our "compartmentalized" thinking. We 
must realize that we are not, per se, army officers, naval officers, or 
air force officers. We are military officers (and by God we are 
Americans too!) and we must, each of us according to our several 
talents, strive to see the broad picture without personal or service 
bias. 
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